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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jason Coapland was in a small crowd of people outside of a Boise homeless shelter
waiting for the doors to open, when he got into a fight with Chance Worosz. Mr. Coapland
stabbed Mr. Worosz during the fight and the State charged Mr. Coapland with aggravated battery
and with the use of a weapon during the commission of that crime.
Over defense objection, the district court allowed a Boise Police Detective to testify that
he heard an unidentified woman say “you didn’t have to do that,” a short time after the stabbing.
Mr. Coapland asserts the district court erred in allowing the jury to hear this statement as it was
inadmissible hearsay. Furthermore, Mr. Worosz testified that he pushed Mr. Coapland prior to
Mr. Coapland stabbing him. As such, Mr. Coapland asserts the district court erred in denying his
request to instruct the jury on self-defense. Finally, Mr. Coapland asserts the accumulation of
these two errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
While leaving the Interfaith Sanctuary1 at around 6 p.m. on January 30, 2016, Detective
Jason Pietrzak of the Boise Police Department, heard a “very angry” and “aggressive” uproar in
a fenced-off area where people were waiting in line to get a bed for the night. 2 (Tr., p.74, L.23 –
p.76, L.21; p.79, L.24 – p.80, L.14.) Detective Pietrzak determined that Chance Worosz had
been stabbed by Jason Coapland, and Mr. Coapland was taken into custody. (Tr., p.84, L.9 –
p.85, L.6; p.102, L.13 – p.103, L.21; p.150, Ls.7-21; p.174, L.12 – p.179, L.20.) The State filed
an Information charging Mr. Coapland with aggravated battery and with the use of a weapon

1

The Interfaith Sanctuary is a night shelter for homeless people. (Tr., p.164, Ls.23-25.)
1

during the commission of that crime, and later filed an Information Part II alleging Mr. Coapland
was subject to the persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.35-36, 57-58.)
Prior to trial, defense counsel submitted proposed jury instructions on self-defense.
Specifically, defense counsel proposed Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions 1517 (Self-Defense),
1518 (Self-Defense – Reasonable Force), 1519 (Self-Defense – Duty to Retreat), and SelfDefense – Participants in Mutual Combat). (R., pp.67-71.) On the first day of trial, the State
told the court it anticipated that no evidence Mr. Coapland acted in self-defense would be
admitted at trial, and moved the court to preclude defense counsel from mentioning self-defense
in his opening statement. (Tr., p.7, Ls.10-16.) Without giving defense counsel a chance to
respond, the district court simply stated, “unless there is a good faith basis for making a claim it
shouldn’t be addressed in opening statements.” (Tr., p.7, Ls.17-19.)
The prosecutor began the State’s opening statement as follows:
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this case is about the defendant being
caught red-handed.
You didn’t have to do that. Why did you do that?
Those were a couple of the statements that Detective [Pietrzak] of the
Boise Police Department was able to understand coming from a group of loud
ruckus people in a group outside Interfaith Sanctuary on January 30, 2016.
Throughout the course of this trial, you will learn that that group had just
witnessed the defendant Jason Coapland stab the victim Chance Worosz in the
stomach.
(Tr., p.68, L.23 – p.69, L.11.)
After testifying in general terms about hearing a “very angry” “uproar” while leaving the
Interfaith Sanctuary (Tr., p.79, L.24 – p.80, L.14), the prosecutor asked Detective Pietrzak,

2

Detective Pietrzak was at the Interfaith Sanctuary investigating an unrelated death. (Tr., p.76,
L.22 – p.77, L.4.)
2

“Were you able to make out any of the words that were being said specifically? (Tr., p.80, Ls.1516).

Defense counsel objected, arguing the prosecutor’s question “is calling for hearsay.”

(Tr., p.80, Ls.17-18.) The district court ruled,
It’s not hearsay if he is describing what he actually observed and heard,
and he’s describing a situation where he is hearing an uproar. So it is both present
sense impression and it’s also not hearsay. I suppose you refer to him as an ear
witness. So please proceed.
(Tr., p.80, Ls.19-25.) Detective Pietrzak again described “a very sudden uproar” and said he
heard “one female voice that said something very consistent with you didn’t have to do that.”3
(Tr., p.81, Ls.3-9.) Later, the prosecutor asked Detective Pietrzak, “I want you to try and
remember any other statements that you heard from the crowd while you were responding to this
incident.” (Tr., p.95, Ls.19-22.) With the court’s prior ruling and no additional objection from
defense counsel, Detective Pietrzak responded,
Yeah, initially the first – the female voice, I heard something very
consistent with “you didn’t have to do that.” There were fuck you’s, you didn’t
have to. You know, one female said you better not have stabbed him. Things like
that were being yelled.
(Tr., p.95, L.23 – p.96, L.3.)
Chance Worosz testified that he had been staying at the Interfaith Sanctuary for the five
months prior to January 30, 2016. (Tr., p.104, L.1 – p.106, L.17.) Around 5:30 that evening,
while waiting to get in line for a bed with his friend and dozens of other homeless people,
Mr. Worosz saw Mr. Coapland pouring a beer into a cup; he told Mr. Coapland that if he was
caught drinking, the Sanctuary staff would not let him have a bed for the night. (Tr., p.106, L.18
– p.109, L.16.) Although Mr. Worosz testified that he used a “pretty friendly tone of voice,”
Mr. Coapland got upset and the two got into a heated argument. (Tr., p.109, L.17 – p.112, L.10;
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p.113, Ls.7-19.) Mr. Worosz testified that he walked away when Mr. Coapland indicated that he
wanted to fight. (Tr., p.112, Ls.14-17; p.132, Ls.15-17.)
While Mr. Worosz smoked a cigarette to “try to calm down,” he heard Mr. Coapland
talking with other people, although Mr. Worosz testified he was not paying attention to what was
being said. (Tr., p.112, Ls.18-25.) After finishing his cigarette, Mr. Worosz got back in line in
front of Mr. Coapland. (Tr., p.114, Ls.6-22.) Mr. Worosz testified that felt uncomfortable
standing in front of Mr. Coapland because he could hear Mr. Coapland speaking to other people,
but he again did not know what was being said. (Tr., p.114, L.23 – p.116, L.10.) When asked to
describe Mr. Coapland’s tone and demeanor, Mr. Worosz stated, “It was subtle. It wasn’t loud.
I just knew that they were speaking. I knew they were speaking about me. I just didn’t know
what it was about.” (Tr., p.116, Ls.11-16.)
Mr. Worosz described what happened next, as follows:
I kept gazing behind myself to see what was going on. And then after one
or two gazes, I caught the knife. I could see it. That’s when I turned around. I
tried to get him away from me. Well, I shouted “get away from me with that
knife.” And then I tried to actually get him away from me.
(Tr., p.116, L.22 – p.117, L.3.) Mr. Worosz continued,
I was intimidated. Definitely intimidated. Because he had [the knife]
ready in his hand. So I needed to make a response at that point. So, you know, I
shouted to make sure someone, you know, someone would hear me. And then,
you know, follow through by attempting to get him away from me.
(Tr., p.118, Ls.13-19.) Mr. Worosz testified that he attempted to get Mr. Coapland away from
him by placing his hands on Mr. Coapland’s chest and pushing him backwards. (Tr., p.119, L.13
– p.120, L.1.) After Mr. Worosz pushed Mr. Coapland, Mr. Coapland swung the knife while Mr.

3

Detective Pietrzak also testified that he heard “people calling somebody a fucker.” (Tr., p.81,
Ls.9-11.)
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Worosz swung at Mr. Coapland with a closed fist. (Tr., p.120, L.14 – p.121, L.12; p.134, L.9 –
p.136, L.16.) Mr. Worosz was stabbed during this exchange.4 Id.
Mr. Worosz’s friend, Don Brown, also testified for the State. (Tr., p.163, L.12 – p.164,
L.3.) Mr. Brown saw Mr. Worosz and Mr. Coapland arguing with each other for a minute or two
and then saw Mr. Coapland “taking a swing at Chance and then Chance responded in selfdefense.”

(Tr., p.166, L.8 – p.167, L.15.)

Mr. Brown testified that Mr. Coapland struck

Mr. Worosz in the gut but he did not see any knife in Mr. Coapland’s hand. (Tr., p.167, L.16 –
p.168, L.5.)
Officer Tyrell Clark testified that he was called to the scene and that he and his partner
eventually took Mr. Coapland into custody. (Tr., p.174, L.12 – p.179, L.20.) During the ride to
the jail, Mr. Coapland stated multiple times “that he was sleeping during the incident.”
(Tr., p.179, L.23 – p.180, L.5.) After arriving at the jail, Mr. Coapland “said that he doesn’t have
a knife. Doesn’t even own a knife. But then later stated that he always has a knife on him and
that he uses it to open cans.” (Tr., p.187, L.21 – p.188, L.9.) Officer Clark testified that
Mr. Coapland told him that he blacks out after drinking one beer, and he had a couple of beers
that day. (Tr., p.191, Ls.21-23; p.194, Ls.19-21.)
Without calling as a witness or identifying the female whom Detective Pietrzak testified
he heard say “you didn’t have to do that,” the State rested. (Tr., p.195, L.22.)
Mr. Coapland testified in his own defense. (Tr., p.199, L.14 – p.219, L.19.) He stated
that he does not remember much about the day in question due to a skull fracture with a subdural
hematoma he suffered when he was 19, and a second subdural hematoma he suffered when he

4

Both Mr. Worosz and Dr. Britani Hill testified that the stabbing caused Mr. Worosz’s intestine
to protrude from his stomach requiring surgery to repair. (Tr., p.123, L.12 – p.124, L.1; p.143,
L.3 – p.159, L.25.)
5

was 35, both of which effect his memory. (Tr., p.203, L.11 – p.205, L.25.) Mr. Coapland
assumed he went to a local church earlier in the day for a meal and then bought a beer while on
his way to the Interfaith Sanctuary. (Tr., p.206, L.16 – p.207, L.2.) Mr. Coapland testified he
always carried a knife with him, using it for utility purposes due to his homelessness.
(Tr., p.207, Ls.3-23.) He testified that he would have only used the knife against another person
if he felt physically threatened by that person. (Tr., p.207, L.24 – p.208, L.12.)
During the jury instructions conference, defense counsel asked the district court to
instruct the jury on self-defense arguing, “I think he has established that he – had he
remembered, if he had pulled out the knife, it would have been in self-defense.” (Tr., p.226,
Ls.17-24.) The district court denied defense counsel’s request finding the evidence presented to
the jury would not warrant giving a self-defense instruction.5 (Tr., p.226, L.25 – p.227, L.7.)
After the district court read the jury instructions to the jury (Tr., p.228, L.9 – p.239,
L.12), the prosecutor gave the State’s closing argument mentioning the phrase “you didn’t have
to do that,” four times before talking about the elements or other evidence the jury heard.
(Tr., p.239, L.16 – p.240, L.15.) Deprived of the ability to argue to the jury that Mr. Coapland
acted in self-defense, defense counsel asked the jury to focus on the “battery” instruction,
arguing that the State did not prove Mr. Coapland acted both willfully and unlawfully.
(Tr., p.247, L.9 – p.251, L.16.) The jury found Mr. Coapland guilty of aggravated battery and
with using a weapon during the commission of that crime. (R., pp.114-115; Tr., p.253, L.23 –
p.254, L.16.) Mr. Coapland admitted to qualifying for the persistent violator enhancement due to
having two prior felony convictions. (Tr., p.255, L.6 – p.259, L.3.)

5

During the sentencing hearing, the district recognized that there was, in fact, evidence to
support Mr. Coapland’s claim that Mr. Worosz struck Mr. Coapland before Mr. Worosz was
stabbed. (Tr., p.301, Ls.7-16.)
6

The district court sentenced Mr. Coapland to a unified term of 20 years, with seven years
fixed. (R., pp.169-171; Tr. p.307, Ls.1-4.) Mr. Coapland filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
(R., pp.172-175.)

7

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by allowing Detective Pietrzak to testify that he
heard an unidentified female say “you didn’t have to do that,” as the statement was
hearsay and was not admissible pursuant to any exception to the hearsay rule?

II.

Did the district court err in failing to instruct the jury on self-defense?

III.

Did the accumulation of errors deprive Mr. Coapland of his right to a fair trial?

8

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Detective Pietrzak To Testify That He
Heard An Unidentified Female Say “You Didn’t Have To Do That,” As The Statement Was
Hearsay And Was Not Admissible Pursuant To Any Exception To The Hearsay Rule

A.

Introduction
The district court abused its discretion when it permitted Detective Pietrzak to testify that

he heard an unidentified female say, “you didn’t have to do that,” not long after the stabbing
occurred. The district court overruled Mr. Coapland’s hearsay objection apparently finding that
the proffered testimony was not hearsay, or alternatively, that the statement was hearsay but
nevertheless admissible as a present sense impression. The district court erred in both of these
findings. The statement was hearsay as it was an assertion, made out-of-court, and offered for
the truth of the matter asserted, and the statement was not admissible as a present sense
impression.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Allowing Detective Pietrzak To Testify That
He Heard An Unidentified Female Say “You Didn’t Have To Do That”
Application of the rules of evidence require trial courts to answer both factual and legal

questions. State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 421 (2009). A district court must exercise “judicial
discretion” when determining the admissibility of evidence, meaning,
the discretionary action of a judge or court ... bounded by the rules and principles
of law, and not arbitrary, capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a
judicial whim, but the exercise of judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by
law, or the equitable decision of what is just and proper under the circumstances.
It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course prescribed by law
and is not to give effect to the will of the judge, but to that of the law.

9

Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (5th ed.1979).) A district court’s discretionary
decision is reviewed for an abuse of discretion wherein a reviewing Court asks whether the lower
court: 1) perceived the ruling as discretionary; 2) acted within the bounds of such discretion and
consistently with the applicable legal standards; and 3) exercised reason. Id. (citing State v.
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 608 (1989)).
After Detective Pietrzak testified that he heard an angry uproar as he was leaving the
Interfaith Sanctuary, the prosecutor asked if he was able to “make out any of the words that were
being said specifically,” and Mr. Coapland’s counsel objected, arguing the question called for
hearsay. (Tr., p.80, Ls.10-18.) Without requiring the State to offer a legal basis for admission of
the out-of-court statement, the district court overruled the objection, ruling
It’s not hearsay if he is describing what he actually observed and heard, and he’s
describing a situation where he is hearing an uproar. So it is both present sense
impression and it’s also not hearsay. I suppose you refer to him as an ear witness.
So please proceed.
(Tr., p.80, Ls.19-25.) Detective Pietrzak then testified he heard “one female voice that said
something very consistent with you didn’t have to do that.” (Tr., p.81, Ls.3-9.) The district
court erred.

1.

The Out-Of-Court Statement Made By The Unidentified Female Was Hearsay
Because It Was An Assertion, Made Out Of Court, And Offered For The Truth Of
The Matter Asserted

The district court based its decision of the premise that a witness who testifies to what he
actually observes and hears is not presenting hearsay. This premise is wrong. “‘Hearsay’ is a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E. 801(c). Hearsay is not admissible
except as provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. I.R.E. 802. “A ‘statement’ is (1) an oral or

10

written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion.” I.R.E. 801(a).
Whether the statement – “you didn’t have to do that” – is hearsay, depends not on
whether Detective Pietrzak could accurately describe what he “actually observed and heard,” but
upon a determination of whether what he heard was 1) an assertion, 2) made out of court, and 3)
offered for the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 801(a), (c). The statement in question meets
all three of these requirements.
First, as opposed to the non-specific “uproar” Detective Pietrzak described, the specific
words that the unidentified female said – “you didn’t have to do that” – was a statement pursuant
to I.R.E. 801(a). The unidentified female asserted that someone did not have to do something.
Second, the statement was made out of court, at the Interfaith Sanctuary, not in court, on the
witness stand. Third, the State’s opening and closing arguments demonstrate that it offered the
statement for the purported truth of the matter asserted – that Mr. Coapland didn’t have to stab
Mr. Worosz – arguing to the jury that the truth of that statement supported a finding that
Mr. Coapland acted both willfully and unlawfully, and that he was guilty of aggravated battery.
Among the elements the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to win a
conviction for aggravated battery, the State had to convince the jury that Mr. Coapland’s actions
were both unlawful and willful.

See I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907. In relevant part, the jury was

instructed that in order to find Mr. Coapland guilty, they must find that he “committed a battery
upon Chance Worosz,” by stabbing him. (R., p.103.) The jury was further instructed that a
“battery” is committed when a person “willfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the
person of another,” “actually intentionally and unlawfully touches or strikes another person
against the will of the other,” or “unlawfully and intentionally causes bodily harm to an

11

individual.” (R., p.105.) The State repeatedly used the purported truth of the unidentified
female’s statement as the theme for their case.
During opening statements the prosecutor argued,
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this case is about the defendant being
caught red-handed.
You didn’t have to do that. Why did you do that?
Those were a couple of the statements that Detective [Pietrzak] of the
Boise Police Department was able to understand coming from a group of loud
ruckus people in a group outside Interfaith Sanctuary on January 30, 2016.
Throughout the course of this trial, you will learn that that group had just
witnessed the defendant Jason Coapland stab the victim Chance Worosz in the
stomach.
(Tr., p.68, L.23 – p.69, L.11 (emphasis added).) The State signified that it would show the
statement Detective Pietrzak heard – “you didn’t have to do that” – reflected the viewpoint of a
“group of people” who caught Mr. Coapland “red-handed” committing the crime of aggravated
battery. The observation that Mr. Coapland “didn’t have to” stab Mr. Worosz, if believed by the
jury, would support their claim that Mr. Coapland committed an aggravated battery on
Mr. Worosz.
The jury, having heard Detective Pietrzak tell them that he heard someone in the crowd
at the Interfaith Sanctuary say, “you didn’t have to do that,” was allowed to consider the truth of
that statement during its deliberations. The State, once again, claimed that the truth of that
statement proved Mr. Coapland was guilty. During closing arguments, the State argued,
This case is about the defendant Mr. Coapland being caught re-handed.
You didn’t have to do that. This is the first phrase or words that Detective
[Pietrzak] heard as he was coming up on this fence area that you guys saw at the
Sanctuary. He just happened to be there by chance or by luck, but those are the
first words he heard. You didn’t have to do that.

12

Now, let’s take that phrase and let’s apply it to what Defense counsel
talked to you guys about when picking this jury. He gave you guys a scenario of
being in line at the grocery store and someone confronting you or bugging or
pestering you. I can’t remember his exact words, but someone approaching you
and having an issue with how many items you had and what line you were in.
And you guys all talked about what you would do in that situation. 6
Not one of you raised your hand and said I would stab the person if I was
confronted in a grocery store line. You didn’t have to do that. That’s a phrase
that might have come to mind if you were in the grocery store line and would
have been stabbed. You didn’t have to do that.
(Tr., p.239, L.16 – p.240, L.15 (emphasis added).) Again, the State argued the truth of the matter
asserted in that statement, “you didn’t have to do that,” as supporting the State’s burden of
proving Mr. Coapland acted unlawfully and willfully when he stabbed Mr. Worosz.
The district court’s reasoning that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay, merely
because the witness can accurately describe “what he actually observed and heard,” is
inconsistent with the applicable legal standards defined in Rules 801(a), 801(c), and 802.
Describing the witness as “an ear witness,” does not change the definition or admissibility of
hearsay. Because the statement was an assertion, made out-of-court, and offered for the truth of
the matter asserted, it was hearsay, and the district court erred in finding it was not.

2.

The Statement Was Not Admissible For Any Valid Non-Hearsay Purpose

To the extent the district court’s ruling on Mr. Coapland’s hearsay objection could be
interpreted as a finding that the proffered evidence was admissible for a non-hearsay purpose,
such a ruling would also be legally erroneous. “A statement will not be considered hearsay if it
is being offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” State v. Hill,

6

During voir dire, defense counsel posed various hypothetical situations asking the potential
jurors what they would do if someone confronted them in line at a grocery store, or followed
them when the potential jurors attempted to move to a different line. (Tr., p.43, L.22 – p.52,
L.6.)
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161 Idaho 444, 448 (2016) (citing State v. Siegel, 137 Idaho 538, 540 (Ct. App. 2002)). “To
show that a statement is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, the party arguing for the
admission must show that the statement will be relevant to an issue in the case without regard for
its truthfulness.” Id. (citing State v. Davis, 155 Idaho 216, 219 (Ct. App. 2013); Idaho Trial
Handbook § 19:4 (2d ed.)). “If the relevance of the statement is dependent on the statement being
true, it will be considered hearsay.” Id. (citing Davis, 155 Idaho at 219.)
The State failed to demonstrate that the statement, “you didn’t have to do that,” was
admissible for a non-hearsay purpose. Detective Pietrzak had already explained that while
leaving the Interfaith Sanctuary, his attention was drawn by a very sudden, aggressive, and angry
uproar. (Tr, p.79, L.24 – p.80, L.14.) The fact that he heard “one female voice that said
something very consistent with you didn’t have to do that,” was no more informative of his
subsequent actions that hearing “people calling somebody a fucker.” (See Tr., p.81, Ls.1-11.)
The State itself recognized as much by next asking Detective Pietrzak, “What did you do in
response to this uproar?”, but not asking him what did he did in response to hearing any specific
statements. (Tr., p.81, Ls.12-13.) The only relevance to the statement was the truth asserted
therein – that somebody did not have to do something.

As such, the statement was not

admissible for any non-hearsay purpose and, to the extent the district court found otherwise, the
district court erred.

3.

The Out-Of-Court Statement Made By The Unidentified Female Was Not
Admissible As A Present Sense Impression

The district court found the statement was “both present sense impression and it’s also
not hearsay.” (Tr., p.80, Ls.22-23.) A “present sense impression” is defined as, “a statement
describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event

14

or condition, or immediately thereafter,” and is not excludable merely because it is an out-ofcourt statement offered for the truth of the matter asserted. I.R.E. 803(1). The district court’s
finding that the statement, “you didn’t have to do that,” was admissible as a present sense
impression under IRE 803(1), is erroneous.7
“‘[T]he interpretation of a rule of evidence, like the interpretation of a statute, is
reviewed de novo.’” Hill, 161 Idaho at 447 (2016) (quoting State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821
(1998)). The requirements for admissibility under I.R.E. 803(1), have not been well-litigated by
Idaho appellate Courts. However, where an Idaho rule matches a federal rule, federal case law
interpreting the federal rule is relevant and helpful to Idaho courts interpreting the Idaho rule.
See State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 759 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho
295, 298 (1990); State v. Vaughn, 124 Idaho 576, 580 (Ct. App. 1993)). Idaho Rule of Evidence
803(1) defines a present sense impression as, “A statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately
thereafter.” Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) defines a present sense impression as, “A statement
describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant
perceived it.” As these rules are essentially identical, federal case law defining the parameters of
F.R.E. 803(1), is relevant to this Court’s review of the requirements for admissibility of hearsay
as a present sense impression pursuant to I.R.E. 803(1).
As one federal court observed,

7

To the extent that the district court was expressing a finding that what Detective Pietrzak heard
was admissible because it was his own “present sense impression,” such a finding would also be
legally erroneous. The “present sense impression” exception applies to the declarant of the
statement, not the person who heard the statement and is called as a witness to convey the
statement. See I.R.E. 803(1). Additionally, just as describing a witness as “an ear witness,” does
not change the definition or admissibility of hearsay, describing the witness as relaying his own
“prior sense impression” does not make what is otherwise inadmissible hearsay, admissible.
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There are three principal requirements which must be met before hearsay
evidence may be admitted as a present sense impression: (1) the declarant must
have personally perceived the event described; (2) the declaration must be an
explanation or description of the event rather than a narration; and (3) the
declaration and the event described must be contemporaneous.
U.S. v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572 (3d Cir.1998) (citing See 5 J. McLaughlin, Weinstein's Federal
Evidence § 803.03 (2d ed.1997); 2 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence § 271 (4th ed.1992)). This
observation is consistent with the plain language of F.R.E. 803(1), and thus I.R.E. 803(1). The
State failed to meet the first two of these requirements.
“One of the principal requirements is that the declarant personally perceived the event or
condition about which the statement is made.” 8 Id. (citing Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 511
(3d Cir.1985) (personal perception a key element to the excited utterance exception); Bemis v.
Edwards, 45 F.3d 1369, 1372–73 (9th Cir.1995) (stating same for both the present sense
impression and excited utterance exceptions).) 9 In Mitchell, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the district court erred in allowing the State to present, as a present sense impression, an
anonymous note found on the front seat of an abandoned get-away car, which purported to
provide the license plate number and a description of a second get-away car alleged armed
robbers drove away in. Id. 145 F.3d at 575-77. The Mitchell Court relied in large part on its
prior decision in Miller v. Keating observing,
In Miller, we stated that “[a] party seeking to introduce [an anonymous
statement] carries a burden heavier than where the declarant is identified to
demonstrate the statement's circumstantial trustworthiness.” Miller, 754 F.2d at
510. We further emphasized: “circumstantial evidence of the declarant's personal
perception must not be so scanty as to forfeit the ‘guarantees of trustworthiness'
which form the hallmark of all exceptions to the hearsay rule.” Id. at 511.
8

The principle that the declarant must personally perceive the event their out-of-court statement
purports to describe is consistent with the rule requiring that, “[a] witness may not testify to a
matter unless evidence is introduced to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge
of the matter.” I.R.E. 602.
9
The parentheticals are as stated in the Mitchell Opinion.
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In Miller, the trial court admitted a statement of an unidentified bystander
at the scene of an automobile accident. Contradictory testimony was provided as
to whose fault the accident was. Plaintiff sought the admission of the statement of
the unidentified person who said, “the bastard cut in,” and sought by that
statement to establish that the accident was caused by the actions of
defendant. Id. at 509.
On appeal we reversed, holding that admission of the anonymous
statement was erroneous because the record was “empty of any circumstances
from which the trial court could have inferred, by a preponderance, that the
declarant saw [the defendant] ‘cut in.’” Id. at 511 (emphasis added). We found
the trial court erred in inferring personal perception on the ground that the
declarant would have made the declaration only if he was in a position to do so.
Instead, we stated that the words of the statement, or the circumstances
surrounding the event, “do not show more likely than not that the declarant saw
the event.” Id. Inasmuch as it was equally likely that the unidentified declarant
was “hypothesizing or repeating what someone else had said,” id., the statement
was inadmissible as an excited utterance.
Miller is dispositive here. Although the government argues that “[a]
common sense reading of the note suggests that the person writing the note was
perceiving the event and in close proximity,” appellee's br. at 14, the record here
is devoid of circumstances indicating by a preponderance that the author of the
anonymous note actually saw Mitchell change cars. Thus, the requirement of
personal perception necessary for both the present sense impression and excited
utterance exceptions to the hearsay rule is not satisfied.
Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576-77.
The State failed to present any evidence that the unidentified female personally observed
the event giving rise to her statement, “you didn’t have to do that.” Like the witnesses described
in both Mitchell and Miller, the State failed to present any evidence that the unidentified female
actually observed the stabbing, rather than reaching that conclusion based upon what others in
the group had said, or on her own suppositions as to what probably happened.10 In fact, the State
did not even present any evidence that the statement was actually directed at Mr. Coapland.
While it is possible that the unidentified woman was telling Mr. Coapland that, in her opinion, he
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did not have to stab Mr. Worosz, it is also possible that she was telling Mr. Worosz that, in her
opinion, he did not have to confront Mr. Coapland and push him. Perhaps the unidentified
female felt that someone else in the group did something that he or she did not have to do that
had nothing to do with stabbing. The pitfall of relying upon an out-of-court statement from an
unidentified person is that, unless the context is obvious and undeniable, no one really knows
what the unidentified person was talking about.
Additionally, the statement in question – “you didn’t have to do that” – neither describes
nor explains the event the State suggested it described and explained – the stabbing – or any
other event for that matter.

It is simply an expression of a value judgment made by the

unidentified female. The State suggested (but failed to demonstrate) that the statement was
aimed at Mr. Coapland, and that it was the unidentified female’s expression that Mr. Coapland
did not have to stab Mr. Worosz. However, even if this was the only possible interpretation of
that statement (which it isn’t), this was simply the unidentified female placing her own value
judgment on Mr. Coapland’s actions, not an actual description or explanation of any event that
occurred.
To illustrate this point, had the unidentified female been identified and called as a
witness, she would have been allowed to testify about what she observed, just as any other
witness who could provide relevant evidence to the jury. However, it was for the jury to
determine whether Mr. Coapland did or did not have to stab Mr. Worosz, based upon the value
judgments reflected in the relevant criminal statutes and jury instructions. The unidentified
woman’s personal opinion on the subject is not relevant, and therefore would not have been

10

Notably, the prosecutors who tried Mr. Coapland did not witness the stabbing, yet they based
their decision to charge him with aggravated battery upon what others had told them and their
own conclusion that he “didn’t have to do that.”
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admissible, because her value judgment would not have a tendency to make a fact that is of
consequence to the jury’s determination more or less probable, than it would be without her own
personal opinion on the matter. See I.R.E. 401, 402, 403.
Because the State failed to show that the unidentified woman saw the stabbing, and
because her statement neither described nor explained the stabbing, the statement – “you didn’t
have to do that” – was not admissible as a present sense impression, and the district court acted
inconsistently with applicable legal principles when it found otherwise.
The district court abused its discretion when it overruled Mr. Coapland’s hearsay
objection and allowed Detective Pietrzak to testify that an unidentified female said “you didn’t
have to do that.”

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears

the burden of proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.”

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008)

(quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991). The question “is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on
evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of” the
inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). “The inquiry, in other words,
is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been
rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable
to the error.” Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
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Mr. Coapland asserts that the State will be unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the jury hearing from Detective Pietrzak that someone in the crowd of people said “you
didn’t have to do that,” did not contribute to the verdict and was harmless.

II.
The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On Self-Defense

A.

Introduction
Mr. Worosz testified that he pushed Mr. Coapland prior to Mr. Coapland cutting him

with the knife. In light of this testimony, the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury on
self-defense.

B.

The District Court Erred In Failing To Instruct The Jury On Self-Defense
A trial court must instruct the jury on all matters of law pertinent to their considerations.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710 (2009) (citing I.C. § 19-2132). The court must honor a
party’s request for a specific instruction if that instruction is “‘correct and pertinent.’” Id.
(quoting I.C. § 19-2132). A proposed instruction is correct and pertinent where: (1) it is a
correct statement of the law; (2) it is not adequately covered by other instructions; and (3) it is
supported by the evidence presented. See id. at 710-711 (citing State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278,
285 (1982)).
The right of self-defense has always been recognized in Idaho. Article I, § 1 of the Idaho
Constitution reads as follows:
All men are by nature free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights, among
which are enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and
protecting property; pursuing happiness and securing safety.
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IDAHO CONST. Art.I, § 1 (emphasis added).11 The basic principle that a person may use nondeadly force in self-defense is recognized in Idaho statutory law. 12

“Lawful resistance to the

commission of a public offense may be made: 1. By the party about to be injured. 2. By other
parties.” I.C. § 19-201. “Resistance sufficient to prevent the offense may be made by the party
about to be injured: 1. To prevent an offense against his person, or his family, or some member
thereof. 2. To prevent an illegal attempt by force to take or injure property in his lawful
possession.” I.C. § 19-202. Furthermore,
No person in this state shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever
for protecting himself or his family by reasonable means necessary, or when
coming to the aid of another whom he reasonably believes to be in imminent
danger of or the victim of aggravated assault, robbery, rape, murder or other
heinous crime.
I.C. § 19-202A.
During the jury instructions conference, defense counsel moved the court to provide the
jury with instructions on self-defense:
Your Honor, I move to have the self-defense instructions. It is IDJI 1518
and 1521.13 I believe there is a good faith basis based on Mr. Coapland’s
testimony regarding the only reason he would pull a knife is in fear of threat. I
think he has established that he – had he remembered, if he had pulled out the
knife, it would have been in self-defense.
(Tr., p.226, Ls.17-24.) The court held,
11

This section, entitled “Inalienable rights of man,” was so uncontroversial that it passed without
debate during the Constitutional Convention. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE IDAHO
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF IDAHO 1889 (L.W. Hart, ed., 1912), p.128.
12
The law governing self-defense where a homicide has occurred is governed by I.C. §§ 18-4009
and 18-4010.
13
Idaho Uniform Criminal Jury Instruction 1518 instructs the jury on the reasonable force
standard applicable in a self-defense case, while Instruction 1521 instructs the jury on the law as
it relates to participants in a mutual combat. While the better practice would have been for
Mr. Coapland’s counsel to either refer to his pre-trial motion (R., pp.63-71), or to specify that
Mr. Coapland also wanted Instructions 1517 (Self-Defense), and 1519 (Duty to Retreat), the
context of Mr. Coapland’s request and the district court’s ruling indicates that Mr. Coapland was,
in fact, asking the court to instruct the jury on all aspects of self-defense jurisprudence applicable
in this case, and the district court denied that request.
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You know, I think that requires a real level of speculation to say “had I
remembered” because it is pretty clear he doesn’t remember. And there’s no
other evidence of anything that would warrant a self-defense instruction. So I do
not think the evidence is sufficient to justify presenting the issue of self-defense to
the jury.
(Tr., p.226, L.25 – p.227, L.7.) The district court erred.
While Mr. Coapland’s speculation alone that he must have acted in self-defense may not
support giving the requested self-defense instructions, it is not necessary that evidence
supporting a self-defense instruction come from the defendant; rather, “A defendant is entitled to
have the jury instruction on his theory of the case whenever there is some supportive evidence
for that theory.” State v. Hansen, 133 Idaho 323, 329 (Ct. App. 2009). As the district court itself
recognized, albeit during the sentencing hearing and in contrast to what the court stated when
asked by counsel for the instruction at trial (Tr., p.226, L.25 – p.227, L.7), there was, in fact,
evidence to support Mr. Coapland’s claim that Mr. Worosz struck Mr. Coapland before
Mr. Worosz was stabbed (Tr., p.301, Ls.7-16).

Mr. Worosz testified that he first pushed

Mr. Coapland, then Mr. Coapland swung at him the knife while Mr. Worosz simultaneously
swung at Mr. Coapland with a closed fist. (Tr., p.119, L.13 – p.121, L.12; p.134, L.9 – p.136,
L.16.)
As the Idaho Supreme court recognizes, “‘[t]he rule is elementary that one unlawfully
assailed may, in self-protection, repel force with force. The extent to which he may go is to be
measured by the character of the assault; but the right, as we have stated it, exists under any and
all circumstances.’” State v. Woodward, 58 Idaho 385, __, 74 P.2d 92, 96 (1937) (quoting
State v. Goering, 106 Iowa 636, __, 77 N.W. 327, 328 (Iowa 1898)). The district court erred in
denying Mr. Coapland’s request to instruct the jury on self-defense.
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C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove The Error In Failing Instruct The Jury On SelfDefense Is Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
As noted above, a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the

State bears the burden of proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained.”

Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)); see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991).
The question “is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the
presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of” the inadmissible evidence. Yates v.
Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). “The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that
occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan v.
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment protects a defendant’s right to present a complete
defense. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17–19 (1967); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S.
479, 485 (1984); see also ID. CONST., art. I, § 13 (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law.”). “A necessary corollary . . . is the rule that a
defendant in a criminal trial has the right, under appropriate circumstances, to have the jury
instructed on his or her defense, for the right to present a defense would be meaningless were a
trial court completely free to ignore that defense when giving instructions.” Taylor v. Withrow,
288 F.3d 846, 851–52 (6th Cir. 2002). Further, “[a]n erroneous instruction that relieves the State
of its burden to prove an element of a charged crime can be characterized as either a violation of
due process, or as a violation of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee.” State v. Parsons,
153 Idaho 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2012) (internal citations omitted). When the defendant has been
denied a fair opportunity to defend against the charge, his conviction must be overturned.
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State v. Kerchusky, 138 Idaho 671, 676 (Ct. App. 2003) (overruled on other grounds as
recognized by State v. Galvan, 156 Idaho 379, 383 (Ct. App. 2014)).
As explained above, a reasonable view of the evidence supported Mr. Coapland’s request
for jury instructions on self-defense. By refusing to instruct the jury regarding Mr. Coapland’s
defense, the district court denied him a fair opportunity to defend against the aggravated battery
charge. See Washington, 388 U.S. at 17–19; U.S. CONST., amend. VI; ID. CONST., art. I, § 13.
Indeed, the court relieved the State of its burden to prove that Mr. Coapland acted unlawfully
when he stabbed Mr. Worosz. See I.C. § 18-903. Thus, the State will be unable to show the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

III.
The Accumulation Of Errors Deprived Mr. Coapland Of His Right To A Fair Trial
Errors which individually might be harmless can require reversal if the accumulation of
those errors show the defendant was denied a fair trial and, thus, due process. State v. Martinez,
125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994); State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002). To find
cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the claims
of error, and then conclude that the aggregate of those errors denied the defendant a fair trial.
State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999).
Mr. Coapland asserts that the combination of the district court’s erroneous ruling
allowing Detective Pietrzak to testify that someone said “you didn’t have to do that,” coupled
with the district court’s erroneous ruling depriving Mr. Coapland’s request to instruct the jury on
self-defense, deprived him of his right to a fair trial, requiring this Court to vacate his conviction.
By erroneously allowing the State to present a purported witness’s opinion that Mr. Coapland
acted unlawfully in that he “did not have to” stab Mr. Worosz, coupled with the failure to
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instruct the jury that a person acting in self-defense does not act unlawfully, the district court’s
errors deprived Mr. Coapland his right to a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Coapland respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for aggravated
battery and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 12th day of January, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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